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INTRODUCTION
Any international scheme must ultimately rest, in the absence of
an international coercive body, on the willful compliance and coopera-
tion of member-states of the world community. World community
proscriptions will therefore be as effective as world-community partici-
pants are desirous of implementing them. The will to participate in a
global system of control is the only alternative to diehard imperatives of
the old self-serving international politics. Such a commitment can only
be attained after the type of activity and conduct sought to be regulated
by world community proscriptions have attained a certain level of op-
probrium in the common morality of mankind. Admittedly there will
seldom be a uniform level or homogeneous sense of values amongst all
people of the world, consequently a minimum common denominator
must be found.
The dangers of drug dependence' and particularly dangerous
drugs are too well recognized scientifically to be debated,2 and their ef-
fect on the user and consequently on society is also well established. The
1970 Report of the International Narcotics Control Board stated, "Any
assessment of the present degree of drug abuse throughout the world
must conclude that the gravity of the situation has deepened during the
1 It has been recommended that the terms "drug addict" and "drug abuse" are in-
adequate. "Addict" means that the individual is physically and psychologically dependent
and is taking excessive amounts of a drug from which he will have both physical and
psychological withdrawal symptoms. The term "abuser" simply connotes that the person
is psychologically dependent, and that the drug he uses will produce psychological symp-
toms but no great physiological disorders when the drug is withdrawn. See 32 WORLD
HEALTH ORGANIZATION BuLL. 721, 722 (1965).
The World Health Organization's Expert Committee on Addiction-Producing Drugs
defines the term "drug dependence" to include all types of compulsive, harmful drug-
taking. See Brill, Medical and Delinquent Addicts or Drug Abusers: A Medical Distinction
of Legal Significance, 19 HASrINns L.J. 783 (1968).
2 Inasmuch as some drugs such as cocaine only create psychological dependence
while others such as opium may create both mental and physical dependence, any refer-
ence to compulsive, harmful drugtaking will hereinafter be referred to as "drug depen-
dence."
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year. Misuse of narcotic and other dangerous substances has escalated
sharply in a number of countries and the outlook is profoundly dis-
quieting."8 Such a commonly recognized individual and social harm
constitutes, therefore, such a minimum common denominator war-
ranting if not compelling cooperation between nation-states to combat
this type of activity.
The obligations which derive from the existence of the contempo-
rary situation of drug dependence are twofold: effective national con-
trols and international cooperation to maximize national efforts. This
type of international responsible participation in world community
processes is by no means limited to those nation-states particularly af-
fected by the consequences of the harmful activity but extends to all
world community participants. A direct consequence of this concept is
the development of an international obligation to combat such criminal-
ity in compliance with the maximum aut dedere aut punire.4
THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN INTERNATIONAL CONTROL SYSTEM
It should be stated at the outset of any study on narcotics that there
is no definition of the term. Certainly there are numerous writings which
provide a pharmacological or psychological classification of substances
in terms of their effect on natural organism and behavior. This is the
main reason why municipal legislation and international treaties refer
to specific substances and drugs rather than attempt a broad definitional
classification. The categories of narcotic substances and dangerous drugs
covered by international agreements are:
1. Opium and its derivative morphine, produced from the poppy
seed. 2. Cocaine produced from the coca bush. 3. Cannabis Sativa, or
indian hemp, known as hashish, marijuana, and bhang and other
names depending on its geographic location. 4. Psychotropic substances,
which are chemically manufactured drugs and not agriculturally pro-
duced.
Not all of these categories have always been the subject of inter-
national control and even among these categories only a limited number
were included in the original measures which were confined to opium
and its derivatives. In 1931, a system of international legislation was
established under which new narcotic drugs could be added by decision
of an international organ, which would be binding upon all signatory
states. This mandatory system applied originally only to certain deriva-
3 U.N. Doc. E/INCB/9 (1970).
4 See Bassiouni, International Extradition and World Public Order, 86 TENN. L. REV.
1 (1969).
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tives of opium and of the coca leaf, but a protocol adopted on November
19, 1948, extended it to all narcotic drugs of whatever chemical struc-
ture, including drugs which are made synthetically; the cannabis sativa
drugs were, however, not included.
The 1961 Single Convention took over these classifications and in-
cluded cannabis sativa, but failed to cover psychotropic substances and
that is the reason for the 1971 Convention on psychotropic substances.
The international control of narcotic drugs scheme is founded
upon ten multilateral treaties concluded between 1912 and 1961, the
last being the Single Convention of 1961, which came into effect on
December 15, 1964. 5 The operation of this system of international con-
trol rests on national controls to be established and supervised by indi-
vidual states within their territorial jurisdiction and subject to their
constitutional limitations. The narcotics treaties provide that the sig-
natory states are to adopt appropriate legislation, introduce necessary
administrative and enforcement measures, and cooperate with interna-
tional control organs as well as with other countries in compliance with
treaty provisions.
More than 100 countries are parties to one or more of the con-
ventions, and are therefore participants in the international control
system; and even countries and territories not bound by any or some of
these treaties nonetheless abide by them (to some extent) in practice. As
a result, universal acceptance of an international control system has
been attained, even though the exercise of effective control measures
still leaves much to be desired as witnessed by the large volume of illicit
traffic. A sense of historic continuity in international cooperation has,
however, been achieved and progress toward more effective controls is
developing consistently. Each Narcotic Convention benefited from the
experience of its predecessor and filled certain gaps while improving
previously existing devices. The object of the system is not to eliminate
narcotic substances and drugs, because of their medical and scientific
importance, but to restrict their uses to these purposes. Thus the di-
lemma of control and difficulty of enforcement: to produce some of
these substances and drugs which are necessary for medical and scien-
tific purposes, but to control their production, limit their use, and curb
their abuse.
The international control scheme is predicated on an indirect
a See Waddell, International Narcotics Control, 64 Am. J. INTL' L. 310 (1970) [herein-
after Waddell]; see also U.N. Doc. E/CN.7/504, Annex 1, for a note by the Secretary-
General which gives a list of treaties and signatories between 1912 and 1961; LowEs,
THE GENESIS OF INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL (1966) [hereinafter LowES].
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method whereby each state exercises and administers its own control
system without interference by an international agency. This is so far
necessitated by the xenophobic attitudes of most nations toward the con-
cept of direct international controls. In fact, because of such attitudes,
only an indirect scheme of international control could have ever de-
veloped. This control scheme is predicated almost entirely on the co-
operation of governments and has two essential characteristics:
1. It depends almost entirely on voluntary international coopera-
tion, and,
2. It has no coercive powers, only the ability to denounce a violator
to the international community and therefore produce a moral
deterrent to insure compliance.
Although each international narcotic agreement will be discussed
separately in this article, the ensuing remarks will encompass several of
these agreements to illustrate the two above-mentioned characteristics
of the control scheme.
A. The Estimate System
The system of estimates was introduced by the 1931 Convention
and administered by the Permanent Central Opium Board and the Drug
Supervisory Body which were merged by the 1961 Single Convention
into the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB). They all pro-
vided for measures of quantitative control extending to signatory as
well as non-signatory states. The estimate system is intended to limit
the narcotics supplies of every country and territory in the world to the
amounts needed for medical and scientific purposes. Every state, regard-
less of whether or not it is a party to any of these Conventions when they
were in force (and presently under the 1961 Single Convention) is re-
quired to furnish its estimates of narcotics needed for the coming year.
The estimate is based on four factors: The quantity of drugs to be con-
sumed for medical and scientific purposes; the quantity of drugs to be
utilized in the manufacture of other drugs, drug containing prepara-
tions, and other drugs not covered in the Single Convention; the quan-
tity of drugs necessary for addition to the special stockpile of drugs held
by a country to meet exceptional circumstances; and, any amount needed
to bring the actual stocks on hand at 31 December of the preceeding year
to meet the level to be held as of 31 December of the year to which the
estimates relate. If a state fails to send such an estimate, the then com-
petent international body may make the estimate and on that basis
the maximum amount importable by that country is established.
[Vol. 46:713
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Though the international body which examines the estimates submitted
by governments never had the power to change them unilaterally, it may
make inquiries with respect both to the estimates as a whole and to a
particular drug. The record of these international bodies shows govern-
ments generally cooperate in furnishing the requested explanations.
Shipments of drugs can be made to a state only within the limits of the
estimates furnished by the importing country or made by the inter-
national body. The INCB (and its predecessor the Permanent Central
Opium Board [PCOB]) can make a determination that the limit of ship-
ments to any country has been reached, and recommend to parties that
they stop either temporarily or permanently the import of drugs, the
export of drugs, or both, from or into the country whose limit has been
reached. The 1953 Protocol contained the strongest enforcement pro-
cedures of any of the international narcotic agreements. Its enforce-
ment provision gave to PCOB the authority to impose a mandatory
embargo upon any party failing to comply with the provisions of the
agreement.
Both the PCOB and presently the INCB also control the quantities
of narcotics supplied to countries by controlling stock piling. If the
INCB finds that a dangerous quantity of drugs is accumulating in any
country, it may recommend under the Single Convention that other
states temporarily or permanently stop shipments of drugs to that coun-
try. It may also make this recommendation if, in comparing the esti-
mates and the statistics furnished by governments, it finds that a country
has violated its treaty provisions relating to the maximum amount of
narcotic drugs which it may manufacture or import, computed on the
basis of the estimates. Although no such recommendation was ever
made by the PCOB or INCB, its authority to do so has nevertheless
occasionally influenced governments to comply more fully with the
relevant treaty provisions.
The 1961 Single Convention continues the practice of the PCOB to
request any state, whether party or not party to the 1925 and 1931 Con-
ventions, to explain a condition which, in the view of the Board, indi-
cates an improper accumulation of narcotic drugs.
B. The Import-Export Certification System
The import certificate and export authorization system constitutes
one of the most important institutions of international narcotics control.
According to this system, no legitimate shipments can be sent from one
country to another without an import authorization from the govern-
ment of the receiving country and a corresponding export authorization
1972]
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from the government of the sending country. Thus, by controlling the
movement of legal drugs, this provision enables detection of any coun-
try's exceeding its import maximum.
C. The Disclosure and Dissemination of Information
Governments provide the international control organs with data
and information on which the system depends. These governments
maintain an import certificate and export authorization system for
foreign trade, furnish annual reports and texts of laws and regulations
enacted by them to implement the narcotics treaties, and report seizures
of narcotic drugs from the illicit traffic and other relevant data. They
notify the United Nations of newly developed substances with possible
dependence-producing properties, and are pledged to place under con-
trol drugs which are found by international control organs to have such
properties or to be convertible into drugs having such properties. The
discovery of new chemicals such as LSD/LSD25 resulted in the 1971
Convention on Psychotropic Substances (discussed below). General com-
pliance has always been the goal of the narcotics control system, for until
all countries are bound by the conventions and implement them in good
faith, illicit traffickers will operate from the territory of non-conforming
states and thus prevent the effective operation of the real power behind
international narcotics control, which is the power of public opinion.
The most effective means of assuring compliance with international ob-
ligations according to the terms of the various narcotics treaties is there-
fore the weapon of publicity. Publicity in the realm of drug use and drug
dependence is a double-edged sword. Overdramatization by the informa-
tion and entertainment media of the supposedly glamorous cloak-and-
dagger aspects of drug trafficking has certainly been harmful to the
efforts of national and international control. Further, the euphoric
"highs" attributed to drug use by well-known musical groups associated
with the "acid rock" culture have greatly hampered efforts to educate
the public with respect to the dangers of drug dependence. On the other
hand, publicity given to the lack of cooperation of a government in this
sphere generally has a salutary effect. Governments are extremely sensi-
tive to any public outcry that they have failed to cooperate in such a
sociohumanitarian activity. Such publicity is intended to be provided
by published reports of the organs of international control based on
information furnished by governments (annual reports, laws statistics,
estimates, seizure reports) and by discussions in various United Nations
bodies and dissemination of general information.
[V/ol. 46:713
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D. The Role of International Organizations
The League of Nations and the United Nations have been closely
associated with these efforts and the administration of this system of in-
direct control.
The organs presently functioning under UN auspices are:
1. The Commission on Narcotic Drugs, and
2. The International Narcotics Control Board (INCB).
The Commission is a policy-making one which succeeded the
League of Nations Advisory Committee on Traffic in Opium and Other
Dangerous Drugs, which was then a general organ of control. The
INCB was established by the 1961 Single Convention and replaced two
specialized administrative organs: the Permanent Central Opium Board
and the Drug Supervisory Body, charged particularly with the super-
vision of the provisions of the narcotics treaties dealing with measures
of quantitative control (statistics and estimates).
The Economic and Social Council and the Commission on Narcotic
Drugs formulate policies, coordinate activities, and supervise the imple-
mentation of international conventions and agreements. They make
particular or general recommendations to governments on these matters
from the World Health Organization.
The technical assistance programs of the United Nations and such
specialized agencies as the World Health Organization (WHO) and the
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) are made available to govern-
ments seeking to cope with their particular problems in this area. 6
E. The Overall Concept
These observations reveal the degree of reliance of the international
control system on the good will of cooperating states and its gradually
developed structures attest to the patience and persistence of those who
for years nurtured its acceptance by generally reluctant states. The
inarticulate premise of the entire system which spans over half a century
(from 1909 to this date) is to reach agreement by as many nations as
possible on attainable objectives. This accounts for the gradual de-
velopment of the system and also for some apparent loopholes and
known weaknesses which still exist. And yet, in spite of the somewhat
patchwork nature of the International Narcotics Control Scheme, much
progress has been made. In reviewing the international control system in
its 1970 report, the INCB stated, "[T]he Board is able to record that,
6 UNITrD NATIONS, INTERNATIONAL CONTROL OF NAconc DRUGS (1965).
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in practical terms, control over the manufacture and distribution of the
substances listed in the 1961 Convention is such that leakage from licit
manufacture and trade into illicit channels during the year has been
minimal." 7 The conclusiori to be drawn is that the process of inter-
national compromise is neither easy nor satisfactory, but ultimately it is
far better than nothing.
II.
A CHRONOLOGY OF INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS
TO CONTROL NARcoTIcs
A. Narcotics Control Prior to the League of Nations
1. The Shanghai Opium Commission of 1909
The realization that some ten million Chinese were opium smokers
and that the practice was extending to other Asian states generated the
proper moral climate for the world's first undertaking to control opium.
Efforts by world political and religious leaders set the stage for this
international conference on narcotic drugs, which led to the signing of
the first treaty three years later.8 Thirteen powers with interests in the
Far East appointed an Opium Commission which met at Shanghai in
1909. The delegates to the Commission had no power to draw up or
sign any treaty, the primary motive for convoking the Commission being
to discuss the international ramifications of the Chinese opium problem.
In spite of the regional character of the meeting, the members of the
Commission were already well aware of the wide geographical scope
and nature of the narcotics problem. Their work represents the first
attempt to deal with the problem on a multilateral international scale.
The Commission passed nine resolutions dealing with various
aspects of the opium problem. It urged gradual suppression of opium
smoking and recommended measures intended to stop smuggling of
narcotics, especially by prohibiting their export to territories which did
not legally permit it. An appeal was also made to the governments con-
trolling foreign concessions and settlements in China to take various
measures to cooperate with the Government of China, and all concerned
governments were strongly urged to take drastic steps to control the
7 U.N. Doc. E/lNCB/9 (1970).
8 Until that period, trade in narcotics was legal and encouraged by England, but
when by 1909 it was estimated that China had ten million opium smokers England,
strongly pressured by the United States and religious groups, dosed the opium trade be-
tween China and India. See House of Commons Resolution of May 30, 1906, 158 PAR..
DEB., H.C. (- ser.) 494, 516 (1906). See also Renborg, International Control of Narcotics,
22 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 86 (1957).
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manufacture and distribution of morphine and other derivatives of
opium.
Although the Commission did not establish any binding obliga-
tions, it indicated the direction for future action.
2. The Hague Convention of 1912
The first international narcotics convention was concluded at The
Hague in 1912.9 It established international cooperation in the control
of narcotic drugs as a matter of international law. The principles laid
down in the Hague Convention of 1912 have remained the basis of
international narcotics control. The Convention stipulated that the
production and distribution of raw opium were to be controlled by law;
that opium smoking was to be gradually suppressed; and that the manu-
facture, sale and use of manufactured narcotic drugs (i.e., of morphine,
other opiates and cocaine) were to be limited by law exclusively to med-
ical and "legitimate" needs; manufacturers of and traders in such drugs
were also subjected to a system of permits and recording.
B. Narcotics Control Under The League of Nations
Article 23 of the League of Nations covenant provided that the
members of the League should "entrust the League with the general
supervision over agreements with regard to ... the traffic in opium and
other dangerous drugs." The first League Assembly created an Advisory
Committee on Traffic in Opium and Other Dangerous Drugs to assist
and advise the League's Council in these tasks. Among other duties, the
Committee initiated various international legislative actions under the
auspices of the League.
1. The Geneva Convention of 1925
The Geneva Convention of February 19, 1925, was a great step for-
ward in the control of narcotic drugs. 10 Governments were required to
submit to the newly created Permanent Central Opium Board annual
statistics concerning production of opium and coca leaves, the manufac-
ture, consumption and stocks of narcotic drugs and quarterly reports on
the import and export of such drugs (including opium and coca leaves).
It also established the system of import certificates and export authoriza-
tions requiring governmental approval of each import and export.
The Permanent Central Opium Board was established to supervise
9 International Opium Convention, signed January 23, 1912, 88 Stat. 1912 (1913),
- T.S. -, 8 L.N.T.S. 187.
10 International Convention Relating to Dangerous Drugs, signed February 19, 1925,
81 L.N.T.S. 317.
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the statistical system introduced by the Convention. It was composed of
eight independent experts serving in their personal capacity and not as
representatives of their governments. The Board was authorized under
certain conditions to recommend an embargo of drug exports to a
country which threatened to become a center for illicit traffic, and thus a
danger to other nations, even if that country was not a party to the
Convention.
2. 1931 Convention for Limiting the Manufacture and Regulat-
ing the Distribution of Narcotic Drugs
The aim of this Convention, signed at Geneva on July 13, 1931, is
to limit world manufacture of drugs to medical and scientific needs."
It contains provisions to restrict the quantities of drugs available in each
country and territory. Countries bind themselves not to exceed in their
manufacture and imports certain maxima computed on the basis of
estimates of their narcotics requirements. In the case of imports exceed-
ing these maxima, the Board may impose an import embargo on the
country or territory concerned. It may also recommend such a drug
embargo against a party to the 1931 Convention which the Board, in
comparing estimates and statistics, has found to have violated its treaty
obligations regarding the maxima of narcotic drugs which it may manu-
facture and import. The annual analytical statement of estimates and
statistics which the Board is required by the Convention to draw up and
the annual report it is required to make to the Economic and Social
Council under the terms of the 1925 Convention present for the year in
question an over-all picture of the legal trade in narcotics.
Because the Drug Supervisory Body is authorized to make estimates
for parties or non-parties if they fail to supply them and because the
Board has the power to embargo imports which would exceed the esti-
mates for the country concerned, the system of quantitative controls has
nearly universal application - a necessary condition for its effective
operation. The elements of control contained in the Conventions of
1925 and 1931, and in the 1948 Protocol (discussed below) are incorpo-
rated in the Single Convention of 1961 (discussed below).
3. The 1936 Convention for the Suppression of the Illicit Traffic
in Dangerous Drugs
The Convention for the Suppression of Illicit Traffic in Dangerous
Drugs was signed in Geneva on June 26, 1936, and came into effect in
11Convention for Limiting the Maufacture and Regulating the Distribution of
Narcotic Drugs, signed July 13, 1931, 48 Stat. 1543 (1933), - T.S. 863, 139 L.N.T.S. 301;
Wright, The Narcotics Convention of 1931, 28 AMf. J. INT'L L. 475 (1934).
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October 1939.12 It was the last treaty on narcotics concluded under the
auspices of the League of Nations. The parties undertook to enact
measures to prevent offenders from escaping prosecution for technical
reasons and to facilitate extradition for drug offenses. Perhaps the key
provision of the 1936 Convention was the provision that required the
Parties to severely punish "particularly by imprisonment or other
penalties of deprivation of liberty," the offenses of illicit narcotic traf-
ficking if such offenses are committed intentionally. This obligation
assumed by each Signatory represented at that time the greatest single
advance in the battle to control illicit drug traffic. Signatories were
required to incorporate certain provisions in their final laws such as:
the imposition of sentences having a deterring effect, and to impose
prison terms rather than fines; punish conspiracy, attempts at, and prep-
aratory acts; punish all traffikers within its jurisdiction, whether nation-
als or foreigners; and surrender fugitive offenders to extradition. Among
opium-producing and consuming countries, the last to prohibit its
unauthorized use were Macao (1946), Iran (1955) and Thailand (1959).
The terms of the Convention were deliberately somewhat vague and
general, accompanied by escape clauses, in order to secure adherence by
countries which would otherwise object to stipulations differing basi-
cally from their national standards. It is the only treaty which is not
replaced by the Single Convention and has been left in force among the
very few countries which have not ratified the Single Convention.
C. Narcotics Control Under the United Nations
The United Nations considered it an urgent task to take the initia-
tive in a control system which had broken down during World War II.
The initiative was taken when, at its first session in 1946, the Economic
and Social Council created the Commission on Narcotic Drugs to carry
out the functions entrusted to the League's Committee on Traffic in
Opium and Other Dangerous Drugs. It was by the Protocol of 1946 that
the functions previously exercised by the League under the various
narcotics treaties concluded before the Second World War were trans-
ferred to the United Nations. The next steps were the Paris Protocol of
1948, which authorized the World Health Organization to place under
international control any dependence-producing drug, and the Opium
Protocol of 1953, which limited the use of and trade in opium to medical
and scientific needs.
12 198 L.N.T.S. 229; Starke, The Convention of 1936 for the Suppression of the
Illegal Traffic in Dangerous Drugs, 31 AM. J. INT'L L. 31 (1937).
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1. The Geneva Protocol of 1946
A protocol signed on December 11, 1946, transferred to the United
Nations the function previously exercised by the League under the
various narcotics treaties concluded before the Second World War.13
The eight members of the Permanent Central Opium Board are
now appointed by the United Nations Economic and Social Council. As
for the Drug Supervisory Body, two of its members are appointed by the
World Health Organization, one by the United Nations Commission on
Narcotic Drugs and one by the Permanent Central Opium Board.
2. The Paris Protocol of 1948
The Commission on Narcotic Drugs, at its first session in
November-December 1946, initiated a study of the procedures necessary
for bringing new synthetic drugs under control.14 This resulted in the
preparation of an instrument known as the Paris Protocol of 1948. The
Protocol was signed at the Palais de Chaillot on November 19, 1948, and
came into force on December 1, 1949. It authorizes the World Health
Organization to place under full international control any new drug
(including synthetic drugs) which could not be placed under such con-
trol by application of the relevant provisions (article 11) of the 1931
Convention and which it finds either to be addiction-producing or
convertible into a dependence-producing drug.
It is generally acknowledged that the Protocol has successfully
forestalled any large-scale abuse of new addiction-producing drugs that
have come into medical use since 1939.
In accordance with the Protocol, every party thereto is obliged to
inform the Secretary-General of the United Nations of any drug used or
capable of being used for medical or scientific purposes - and not com-
ing within the scope of the 1931 Convention - which that party con-
siders capable of producing addiction or convertible into an
addiction-producing drug. The Secretary-General is required immedi-
ately to transmit this notification to the other states who are parties to the
Protocol, as well as to the Commission on Narcotic Drugs and to the
World Health Organization. The World Health Organization must
then decide whether the drug in question is addiction-producing or
13 Protocol Amending the Agreements, Conventions and Protocols on Narcotic Drugs,
Open for Signature December 11, 1946, 61 Stat. 2230 (1947) & 62 Stat. 1796 (1948), -
T.IA.S. 1671 &: 1859, 12 U.N.T.S. 180. See also Gregg, The United Nations and the
Opium Problem, 13 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 96 (1964) [hereinafter Gregg].
14 Protocol Bringing under International Control Drugs Outside the Scope of the
Convention of July 13, 1931 for Limiting the Manufacture and Regulating the Distribu-
tion of Narcotic Drugs, - T.I.A.S. 2308, 44 U.N.T.S. 277.
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capable of conversion into a dependence-producing substance. The
Secretary-General is advised of the World Health Organization's de-
cision. He then communicates this decision to all member states of
the United Nations, to the non-member states parties to the Protocol, to
the Commission on Narcotic Drugs and to the Permanent Central
Opium Board. Upon being informed of a finding by the World Health
Organization that the drug is addiction-producing or convertible into a
dependence-producing drug, the states parties to the Protocol are bound
to subject the substance to the appropriate measures of control.
The Protocol also stipulates that, on receipt of a communication
from the Secretary-General about a new drug, the Commission on Nar-
cotic Drugs may decide that the drug in question be put immediately
under provisional control, pending notification of the conclusions of
the World Health Organization.
This protocol received almost universal adherence, but in fact
newly discovered dependence-producing drugs were not brought under
effective international control. This is one of the reasons for the 1971
Convention on Psychotropic Substances.
3. The 1953 Protocol for Limiting and Regulating the Cultiva-
tion of the Poppy Plant, the Production of, International and
Wholesale Trade in, and Use of Opium
With the aim of limiting the production of opium to the quantities
needed for medical and scientific purposes, the Commission on Narcotic
Drugs endeavored to bring about an international opium monopoly,
with quotas allocated to the various opium-producing countries and
with a system of international inspection.
The principal opium-producing and drug-manufacturing countries,
however, could not reach agreement on several important questions,
such as the price of opium, international inspection, and so on. Conse-
quently the Economic and Social Council turned to an alternative plan,
proposed in the Commission by France, which formed the basis of a
protocol adopted by the United Nations Opium Conference held in
New York in May-June, 1953. This protocol came into force on March
8, 1963.15
The 1953 Protocol limits the use of opium and the international
trade in it to medical and scientific needs and eliminates legal over-
production of opium through the indirect method of limiting the stock
of the drug maintained by individual states. The Protocol provides for
15 U.N. Doc. E/N.T. (19 - ); [19---1 14 U.S.T. 10, 18 T.I.A.S. 5273; see also Lowrs,
supra note 5; Gregg, supra note 13.
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the licensing of poppy farmers in opium-producing countries and
specifying the areas which may be cultivated. Producing states are under
an obligation to set up an agency to which all the opium thus produced
has to be delivered immediately after harvesting. The Protocol em-
powers the Permanent Central Opium Board to employ certain super-
visory and enforcement measures- such as requests for information,
proposals for remedial measures, and local inquiries, which can, how-
ever, be undertaken only with the consent of the government concerned.
The two most forceful measures found in the 1953 Protocol are found
in no other international narcotics control agreement. First, a closed list
of only seven countries - Bulgaria, Greece, India, Iran, Turkey, the
U.S.S.R. and Yugoslavia - are authorized to produce opium for export.
Such restricted authorization was not included in the 1961 Single Con-
vention. Second, article 12 gave the PCOB the authority not only to
recommend but to impose a mandatory embargo on the import or ex-
port of opium or both from or to a country which failed to carry out
the obligations under the Protocol.
In 1963, the position of the United States in reply to questions
regarding the continued effectiveness of the opium Protocol was that it
continued to be binding upon its parties notwithstanding the 1961
Single Convention and the Departmental State Position which will be
discussed below.
4. The Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961
The Single Convention of 1961 went into effect 13 December
1964.16 This convention is a milestone in the history of international
16 U.N. Doc. E/Conf. 34/22 (1961); Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961, open
for signature March 30, 1961, [19-] 18 U.S.T. 1407, T.I.AS. 6298, 520 U.N.T.S. 204. For
its background see Note, Integration of International Legislation, 45 Am. J. INT'L L. 770
(1951). For an analysis see Waddell, supra note 5; Gregg, The Single Convention for Narco-
tic Drugs, 16 FooD, DRuG & COSM. L.J. 187 (1961); Lande, The Single Convention, 16 INT'L-
ORGANIZATION 776 (1962). For a U.S. position report by the U.S. Department of State see
61 Am. J. INT'L L. 802 (1967). For the Convention's effect on marijuana see Note, Effects
of the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs upon the Regulation of Marijuana, 19
HASTINoS L.J. 848 (1968). Parties to the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961
Afghanistan Ceylon Fiji
Algeria Chad Finland
Argentina Chile France
Australia China Gabon
Barbados Costa Rica Gambia
Belgium Cuba Ghana
Botswana Cyprus Greece
Brazil Czechoslovakia Guatemala
Bulgaria Dahomey Guinea
Burma Denmark Guyana
Byelorussian S.S.R. Ecuador Holy See
Cameroon Egypt Hungary
Canada Ethiopia India
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narcotics control. More than half the members of the UN ratified the
Convention and a greater number apply its provisions.
The first objective of this Convention was the unified codification
of existing multilateral treaties in this field, with the exception of most
provisions of the 1936 Convention on illicit traffic which are to be con-
tinued. As among parties to the Single Convention, all the other eight
treaties cease to exist, and even in the case of the 1936 Convention, its
article 9, relating to extradition, is terminated as between parties to
both conventions, and replaced by a provision in the Single Convention.
The new treaty simplified the international control machinery
and changed the Permanent Central Opium Board and the Drug Su-
pervisory Body into a single unit - the International Narcotics Control
Board.
The Single Convention also extended its control system to the
cultivation of plants grown as raw material for natural narcotic drugs.
It continues most of the controls on the production of opium laid down
in the 1953 Opium Protocol. The Convention for the first time subjects
the harvesting of cannabis, cannabis resin and coca leaves to the same
control requirements, as it does for opium. It should be noted that a
recent case in the United States held that the identical criminal treat-
ment of cannabis offenders and heroin offenders violates the equal
protection clause of the 14th amendment of the United States of
America inasmuch as the difference between the dependence-producing
propensities of the tvo drugs is an established fact.17 In its penal provi-
sion, the Single Convention requires each party - subject to its con-
stitutional limits - to designate as punishable offenses all intentional
violations of its control provisions regarding cultivation, production,
Iraq Nauru Switzerland
Israel Netherlands Syria
Ivory Coast New Zealand Thailand
Jamaica Niger Togo
Japan Nigeria Tonga
Jordan Norway Trinidad and Tobago
Kenya Pakistan Tunisia
Korea Panama Turkey
Kuwait Paraguay Ukrainian S.S.R.
Lebanon Peru U.S.S.R.
Lesotho Philippines United Kingdom
Malawi Poland United States
Malaysia Saudi Arabia Upper Volta
Mali Senegal Venezuela
Mauritius South Africa Viet-Nam
Mexico Spain Yemen (Aden)
Monaco Swaziland Yugoslavia
Morocco Sweden Zambia
17 See Robinson v. California, 370 US. 660 (1962); People v. McCabe, - Ill. - , 275
N.E.2d 407 (1971); M. CHmir BAssIouNi, CRIINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES: THE LAW oF PUB-
IC ORDER 150-51 (1969) [hereinafter BASSIOUNI].
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manufacture, trade, distribution, etc., of drugs as laid down in the
treaty. Each such offense is similarly to be considered a distinct
offense and foreign convictions are to be taken into account by courts
for the purpose of establishing extradition. Extradition is recommended
in the case of offenses against the provisions of the Convention and if
extradition is not practicable, a foreign offender is to be prosecuted in
the country in which his offense was committed or in the country in
which he was found.
The Single Convention is a flexible and generally accepted treaty
representing the highest common denominator for the acceptance of
international obligations by sovereign countries. There have been some
misgivings expressed, however, that in certain respects, especially in its
provisions for the controlling of opium production, it is not as strong
as the earlier treaty it replaces (1953 Opium Protocol). The Commission
on Narcotic Drugs and the Economic and Social Council, while recog-
nizing a basis for such fears, considers safeguards to make any abuse at
least impractical, if not impossible, for a state belonging to the com-
munity of nations. In its plenary meeting of 11 November 1970, the
Economic and Social Council adopted a resolution requesting concerted
UN action against drug dependence and establishment of a UN fund for
drug dependence control.' In its 1930th meeting, 15 December 1970,
the General Assembly of the UN adopted a resolution calling upon
member states and appealing to non-member states to consider seriously
the possibility of enacting adequate legislation providing severe penal-
ties for those engaged in illicit trade and trafficking of narcotic drugs.1
1. The Functions of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs: (1) As-
sists the Council in exercising such powers of supervision over the
application of international conventions and agreements dealing with
narcotic drugs as may be assumed by or conferred on the Council; (2)
carries out such functions entrusted to the League of Nations Advisory
Committee on Traffic in Opium and Other Dangerous Drugs by the
international conventions on narcotic drugs as the Council has found
necessary to assume and continue; (3) advises the Council on all matters
pertaining to the control of narcotic drugs and perpares such draft
international conventions as may be necessary; (4) considers what
changes may be required in the existing machinery for the international
control of narcotic drugs and submits proposals to the Council; (5)
performs such other functions relating to narcotic drugs as the Council
may direct.
18 U.N. Doc. E/Res. 1559(XIX) (1970).
19 U.N. Doc. A/Res. 2720(XXV) (1971).
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A division of the Secretariat of the United Nations, transferred in
1955 from New York to Geneva, it is in charge of administrative and
research duties in the field of narcotics. It includes a laboratory, which
is entrusted with scientific research and coordinates research carried on
by scientists of individual countries. The Commission is composed of
24 members.
2. The Functions of the INCB. Unlike the Commission this is
not a UN-created board but is a product of the narcotics treaties and its
incumbents consist of 11 persons. It: (1) Enforces the provisions of the
Convention; (2) secures estimates of drug requirements, existing stocks,
production and consumption statistics and statistics on seizures of un-
lawfully held drugs and publishes results; (3) requests information,
explanations and public declarations by governments; (4) recommends
embargoes on imports and exports; (5) gathers and publishes texts of
laws and regulations concerning narcotics from signatory states.
a. Weaknesses of the Single Convention*
These weaknesses can be summarized in the following areas:
1. It rests essentially upon faithful cooperation by all parties in the
context of their national decisions rather than upon effective interna-
tional measures.
2. The limited authority given the international control bodies -
the Commission on Narcotic Drugs and the International Narcotics
Control Board - is apparently inadequate to halt or even to slow down
the increasing illicit traffic.
3. The Convention lacks a precise obligation, machinery and
incentives for preventing over-production of drugs such as a mandatory
embargo.
4. It fails to clearly prohibit production of certain medically and
scientifically unnecessary substances and drugs.
5. It has no direct controls over the execution of any treaty pro-
vision, particularly with respect to production controls which are very
indirect.
6. It has no assignment of production quotas or production
ceilings.
7. It does not prevent countries from entering into the production
market.
8. The denunciation of the Convention is rather facile and opera-
* See, however, the 1972 Geneva Protocol amending the 1961 Single Convention below
which dealt with some of these weaknesses.
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tion outside its ambit is possible (to wit: the People's Republic of
China).
9. There is no international enforcement machinery (Interpol has
no jurisdictional authority).
10. There are no international sanctions applicable to individual
offenders. The Convention only requires each Party to punish an of-
fender under its own law if it sees fit to do so. Each Party has the right to
refuse to effect the arrest or grant extradition where it feels the offense is
not "sufficiently serious."
11. The Convention does not apply to psychotropic substances.
12. It has no requirement to show where narcotic drugs are being
cultivated and/or manufactured.
13. The limitations on the amounts of narcotic drugs that a
country may stockpile are not as extensive as those in the 1953 Protocol.
14. The use of counterfoil books in the writing of prescriptions
and the requirement that all written material referring to drugs carry
the international non-proprietary name are not mandatory obligations.
Since a discussion of these areas cannot be effective without pro-
posing an alternative, it will be dealt with in the conclusion of this
article; however, the position of the United States concerning some of
these weaknesses was presented in its working paper submitted to the
Commission on Narcotic Drugs and is as follows: 20
First, the efforts made in the 1953 Protocol to limit the pro-
duction of opium to seven named countries were rejected by the
provisions of the Single Convention. Instead of continuing the in-
ternational effort to limit the number of countries permitted to
produce opium for export, the 1961 Convention permits any coun-
try to do so - with certain limitations. Instead of firm international
commitments limiting the production of opium, the Convention
leaves the determination of such matters to the individual parties.
Important decisions, such as whether manufacture and trade in the
most dangerous drugs, heroin for example, will be permitted, is left
entirely to the opinion of each individual party. Whether a party
will initiate the production of opium or increase its existing pro-
duction is left to the discretion of that party subject to only very
general guidelines regarding over-production.
Second, the powers of the international control bodies are es-
sentially to make recommendations. Aside from the authority of
the Commission to add new drugs to the Schedules annexed to the
Convention or transfer a drug from one Schedule to another, the
20 Working paper submitted by the United Nations to the Commision on Narcotic
Drugs, U.N. Doc. E/CN - /341 (1970).
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Commission may only consider matters pertaining to the aims of
the Convention, call certain matters to the attention of the Board,
make recommendations regarding the implementation of the Con-
vention, and draw the attention of non-parties to decisions and
recommendations made under the Convention.
The Board's authority is similarly limited. It may study, ask
questions about, and make determinations with respect to esti-
mates submitted on drug requirements and make recommendations
thereon. It may make recommendations to the parties that they
stop the import of drugs, the export of drugs, or both from a
country or territory. It may also notify countries to stop exports
to a country which has imported drugs exceeding its estimates.
It is powerless, however, to conduct on-the-spot investigations un-
less invited to do so. Its sources of information rest almost com-
pletely upon governments. There are very limited possibilities for
checking on the accuracy or completeness of information submitted.
Third, the Convention provides neither the effective machinery
nor the incentive to prevent over-production which feeds the il-
licit traffic in opium and its derivatives. The requirements for re-
porting are such that except for imports and exports of drugs and
poppy straw - which must be reported quarterly - at least a year
elapses before the Board can be aware of an over-production of
opium or of synthetic drugs having the same effects. Such over-
production becomes a source and pressure for illicit traffic.
b. Suggested Amendments to the Single Convention: The Ameri-
can Position
Amendments to the Convention can be made by proposal of any
one signatory state as long as there are not objections from other
signatories or by a conference called ECOSOC (art. 47). The amend-
ments being considered by the United States have two basic objectives:
(1) to establish enforceable controls and control machinery to assure the
necessary limitations, both on producers and manufacturers, and (2) to
provide inducements to parties to faithfully perform all their treaty
obligations, as well as assistance, so that they can take the necessary steps
to limit the production of opium and operate effective domestic narcotic
control systems. These objectives would be accomplished by the follow-
ing measures:
1. A new Annex to the Single Convention would specify quotas
not only for the cultivation of the opium poppy and the production
of opium, but also for the manufacture and export of opium de-
rivatives and synthetic substances having effects similar to opium
or its derivatives;
2. The Commission would be authorized (a) to decide annually
the quotas for the following opium year; (b) to collect and verify
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information required for performing its functions, including the
authority to send inspectors into a State or territory producing
opium or manufacturing narcotic drugs to investigate conditions
therein; (c) to adopt remedial measures if a State seriously exceeds
an approved quota; (d) to administer a fund to provide significant
assistance to governments desiring to limit opium production or
to improve domestic control systems; and (e) to collaborate with
and assist other international organizations and governments in the
prevention of addiction and in therapeutic measures such as educa-
tion, rehabilitation and social programs. It is recognized that an
Implementation Assistance Fund under the Single Convention may
not be necessary if the proposed Special United Nations Fund for
Drug Control is established and becomes operative.
In a letter dated 18 March 1971, from the Permanent Representa-
tive of the USA to the UN, Mr. George Bush, addressed to the Secretary-
General, it was proposed to convene a plenipotentiary conference early
in 1972 to amend the Single Convention by strengthening the Inter-
national Narcotics Control Board in five areas: 21
1. Access to information. The Board can at present require States
to provide only information relating to consumption of drugs,
stocking of drugs, utilization of drugs for the manufacture of
other drugs, and import and export of drugs. We propose, in
amending articles 14, 19, and 20 to give it the important addi-
tional authority to inquire about the cultivation of the opium
poppy and the production of opium in a State party to the
Single Convention. This will allow the collection of information
about the raw material of narcotics from which illicit diversion
normally occurs.
2. Opportunity to make use of all available information. The
Board may now base its actions only on information officially
submitted by a Government under an article of the Single Con-
vention or communicated to it by United Nations Organs. We
propose, by amending article 14, to add to this authority so that
the Board could act on the basis of all information that may
become available to it by any means, not only information offi-
dally submitted but also other information, which it may obtain
through public or private sources. This will be a particularly
useful addition to its powers since the official information re-
leased by governments often does not and cannot provide data
that is relevant to illicit diversion.
3. Local inquiry. The rapid spread of hard narcotics addiction has
demonstrated the need to give the Board authority, in certain
instances, to designate, with the agreement of the State con-
cerned, an individual or a team to make on-the-spot inquiry
21 U.N. Doc. E/4971(L) (1971).
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of drug-related activities. We propose to give the Board this
authority by amending article 14.
4. Power to modify estimates. The Single Convention requires
parties to furnish the Board estimates on consumption of drugs,
stocking of drugs, and use of drugs to manufacture other drugs.
These estimates are in turn linked to manufacture and importa-
tion of drugs. The Board now may only question these esti-
mates; it may not change them. We propose that in addition to
requiring estimates for the first time on cultivation of the
opium poppy and production of opium, the areas where the
threat of illicit diversion is greatest, the Board be given new
authority to modify estimates submitted by States. This will
permit the Board to control narcotics activity that is a real or
potential source of illicit diversion and to conform that activity
to world medical and scientific requirements as determined by
experts. We propose, therefore, to amend articles 12, 19, and 24
and to insert a new article 21 vis entitled "Limitation of Produc-
tion of Opium."
5. Mandatory embargo. The Board may now only recommend cer-
tain steps to States parties, including that they cease export
and/or import of drugs to or from a particular country when
the Board believes the aims of the Single Convention are being
seriously endangered by reason of the failure of the country
concerned to carry out the provisions of the Convention. We
propose, by amending article 14, to give the Board the power
to make such an embargo mandatory upon all parties in the
above circumstances or when it determines that, regardless of
intent or negligence, there is a danger that any country or
territory is becoming a center of illicit traffic. As at present, the
country concerned would continue to have the right to appeal
to the Economic and Social Council as the political body pri-
marily responsible for supervision of the Single Convention.
If these amendments are adopted, the international community
will be able for the first time to require, as a matter of right,
full information on the cultivation of the opium poppy and
the production of opium, to order reductions in cultivation or
production where there is a significant danger of illicit diver-
sion or where world needs are already being met, and to order
worldwide remedial measures to be taken.
Additionally, the United States believes it would be desirable,
by amending article 36, to strengthen the extradition provi-
sions contained in the Single Convention along the same lines
as the New Convention for Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of
Aircraft recently adopted at The Hague. Narcotics offences al-
ready enumerated in the Single Convention would thus imme-
diately become extradictable offences.
The United States has suggested further amendments to the Single
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Convention. The recommendations suggest that the Board be empow-
ered to recommend to UN authorities that financial and technical
assistance be provided to a State in support of its efforts to fulfill its
obligations under the Single Convention.
The membership of the Board should be increased from eleven to
thirteen individuals so that better geographic representation may be
achieved.
The Board should be empowered to approve the sale for export
of opium seized in illegal traffic. Such approval would be made on a
case by case basis.
Additional measures should be taken to control the coca leaf and
its potentially dangerous products, including cocaine.
The United States was always at the forefront of international con-
trols although some may doubt its altruism since it is the world's largest
consuming nation of legal and illegal drugs. The real test for American
credibility will be in two rather different areas. One will deal with re-
habilitation and treatment of drug offenders which the Comprehensive
Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 contemplates, but for
which the United States still has insufficient facilities; the other will be
in connection with the 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances. In
this latter case the United States is the world's largest producing nation,
and those nations which produced other substances had for years suf-
fered the brunt of American criticism but today the shoe is on the other
foot. The United States is keeping negotiations for amendments to the
Single Convention separate from negotiations on the Psychotropic Con-
vention. As to the former, its position, as discussed above, is for more
controls, but as to the latter, it is not so much in favor of international
controls, a position shared by other European industrial nations with
strong chemical industries.
c. The 1961 Single Convention and the 1953 Opium Protocol
The Single Convention extends its control system to the cultivation
of plants grown as raw material for natural narcotic drugs including the
production of opium as laid down in the 1953 Opium Protocol. The
view that the Single Convention replaces the 1953 Protocol is based
upon the provisions of article 44 of the Single Convention which reads
as follows:
The provisions of this Convention, upon its coming into force,
shall, as between Parties hereto, terminate and replace the provi-
sions of the following treaties:
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(i) Protocol for Limiting and Regulating the Cultivation of
the Poppy Plant, the Production of, International and Wholesale
Trade in, and Use of Opium, signed at New York on 23 June 1953,
should the Protocol have come into force.
The United States Department of State in 1963 held a different
position to which it presumably still adheres to since it has not officially
changed it so far.22 So as to avoid misunderstanding of this position, it
is quoted in its entirety as follows:
As the 1953 Protocol entered into force on March 8, 1963, the
entry into force of the Single Convention will require consideration
of three categories of obligations between States parties to the Pro-
tocol, namely:
1. Obligations between parties to the Protocol that do not
become parties to the Single Convention.
2. Obligations between parties to the Protocol that do not
become parties to the Single Convention and Parties to the
Protocol that become Parties to the Single Convention.
3. Obligations between parties to the Protocol that become
parties to the Single Convention.
The obligations among the first group of parties to the Proto-
col, those that do not ratify the Single Convention, are not affected
in any manner by the Single Convention. The intent of the Single
Covention is to terminate and replace the Protocol only as between
parties to the Convention.
The obligations in the second group, namely, those involved
in relations between the parties to the Protocol that do not become
parties to the Convention, on the one hand, and the parties to the
Protocol that become parties to the Single Convention, on the other
hand, are likewise unaffected by the provisions of the Single Con-
vention. As long as at least one State remains a party to the Pro-
tocol without becoming a party to the Single Convention, that one
State can demand that all the other parties to the Protocol, even
though they have become parties to the Single Convention, must
observe their obligations under the Protocol to that one State. It
should again be noted that the Single Convention does not attempt
to relieve parties to the Protocol that become parties to the Single
Convention from their obligations to parties to the Protocol that
have not become parties to the Single Convention.
In considering the third group of obligations, namely, those
between States parties to the Protocol that become parties to the
Single Convention, we are immediately faced with the language
that the Convention shall replace and terminate the Protocol as
between parties to the Convention. A question arises whether that
language is binding upon any State that does not become a party
22 Office of the Legal Advisor, U.S. Dep't of State, The Continued Application of the
1953 Opium Protocol, 57 Aw. J. IN'L . 896 (1963).
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to the Convention. For example, how can States parties to the
Protocol be bound by that language in the Convention unless and
until they become parties to the Convention In view of the con-
tinuing treaty obligations between the parties to the Protocol that
do not become parties to the Single Convention and the parties to
the Protocol that become parties to the Single Convention, the
latter group will be required, in their relations with each other, to
continue to observe their obligations under the Protocol. The Pro-
tocol, like most of the earlier international instruments regarding
narcotic drugs, is intended to be world-wide in its application. It
is intended to impose obligations upon each party not only with
respect to their relations with other parties to those instruments
but also with respect to their relations with States that have not
become parties.
Heretofore, except for certain provisions of the 1912 Narcotics
Convention being replaced by the 1925 Convention, and certain de-
positary provisions being changed by the 1946 Protocol, each of the
international narcotics agreements that has been brought into force
has simply added to, rather than changed, existing obligations.
None of the narcotics agreements concluded prior to the Single
Convention of 1961 has in any manner relaxed controls previously
established; they have added to and strengthened the existing con-
trols. The Single Convention of 1961, has, however, omitted several
of the controls embodied in the 1953 Protocol, for example, the
closed list of producers of opium for export, and the provisions
on limitations on stocks. In view of this, along with the intended
world-wide application of the Protocol, the States that remain par-
ties to the Protocol but do not ratify the Single Convention have a
perfect right under international law to insist that all States parties
to the Protocol continue to observe, with respect to every other
State, the restrictions imposed by the Protocol, even though some
of those states become parties to the Single Convention.
The provisions of article 44 of the Single Convention, relating
to the replacement of the Protocol as between States parties to the
Single Convention, cannot apply in certain respects, for the simple
reason that those provisions do not relieve those States of their
obligations vis-4-vis the parties to the Protocol that are not parties
to the Single Convention. It may be true that States parties to the
Single Convention can, as between themselves, give effect to certain
provisions thereof, but only to the extent that the rights and obliga-
tions involved are of concern solely to them and do not affect in
any way the rights and obligations under the Protocol of States that,
being parties to the Protocol, have not become parties to the Single
Convention. If any action by States parties to the Single Conven-
tion is contrary to the terms of the Protocol, even though entirely
in accord with the terms of the Single Convention, any State a
party to the Protocol and not to the Single Convention will have
a right to protest against violation of the terms of the Protocol,
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particularly if its rights under the Protocol are being contravened.
To put it another way, States parties to the Single Convention can-
not appropriately do anything under the terms of that Convention
if what is done is contrary to any of the terms of the Protocol as
applied to States that are parties to the Protocol and not to the
Single Convention.
Accordingly, the entry into force of the Single Convention will
not relieve States parties to that Convention from any of the obliga-
tions they entered into under the Protocol. The same principle
applies to all the other existing international agreements on nar-
cotics. In the case of those other instruments, parties can now with-
draw on one year's notice or less, but notice of termination of the
Protocol can be given only after five years have elapsed from March
8, 1963, the date of its entry into force.
Established principles of international law indicate that the posi-
tion taken by the United States has considerable validity. A commonly
understood principle in the international law of treaty interpretation
states that a treaty can only be terminated by a unanimous decision of
the parties to the agreement. Lord McNair stated,
the parties who concluded a treaty can lawfully terminate it by
agreement, express or implied. This statement presupposes that
they alone are interested in the continued existence and that no
third party has acquired an interest in its preservation.23
It would appear that since some parties to the 1953 Protocol have not
signed the 1961 Single Convention which attempted to terminate the
1953 agreement, those parties would have an interest in its preservation.
The principle of projecting genuine expectations would give such par-
ties a justified right to have the provisions of the 1953 Protocol recog-
nized and enforced.2 4 The 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties states in article 30,
Subject to Article 103 of the United Nations Charter the rights
and obligations of States parties to successive treaties relating to
the same subject matter shall be determined in accordance with the
following paragraphs:
... 4 (b) As between a State party to both treaties and a State
party only to the earlier treaty, the earlier treaty governs their
mutual rights and obligations.25
From the foregoing it may be forcefully argued that some parties to the
1953 Protocol have acquired and retained enforceable rights under this
23 L. McNAm, THE LAw oF TREATIES 506 (1961) (footnotes omitted).
24 See M. McDouGAL, H. LAssrivLL, J. MILLER, THE INTERPRrATiON oF AGREEMENTs
AND WORLD ORDER: PRINCIPLES OF CONTENT AND PROCEDURE 156-86 (1967).
25 U.N. Doc. A/Conf 89/27 (1969).
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document. International law requires all states, whether signatories to
the Single Convention or not, to honor the rights of such parties. The
following hypothetical example will provide an illustration of the prob-
lem at hand. Under the 1953 Protocol only seven countries are permit-
ted to export opium. No such limitation is contained in the Single
Convention. If country A (party to 1953 and 1961 agreements) sells
opium to country B (party to 1953 and 1961 agreements) country A
would be in violation of international law with respect to country C
(party to 1953 Protocol), assuming country A is not one of the seven
countries authorized to sell opium under the 1953 Protocol.
From the foregoing analysis it appears that the 1953 Protocol and
all other international narcotics control agreements are still valid inter-
national law to the extent enforcement of the provisions of the Single
Convention infringes upon the rights of states parties to the prior agree-
ments but not parties to the Single Convention.
5. Convention on Psychotropic Substances, 1971
Strict international controls over LSD, mescaline and similar sub-
stances - including regulations more rigorous than existing controls for
other drugs such as morphine, for example - are provided for in this
new international agreement adopted by a United Nations Conference
in Vienna, 19 February 1971.26
The agreement, known as the Draft Protocol on the Control of
Psychotropic Drugs Outside the Scope of the Single Convention on
Narcotic Drugs of 1961, covers 32 substances having hallucinogenic ef-
fects on the human organism including "pep pills" which stimulate the
central nervous system, barbiturate-type sleeping pills and tranquillizers
which are depressants.
The substances are listed in four schedules annexed to the Conven-
tion, which provides for varying degrees of control over the substance in
each schedule. They are: Schedule I - DET, DMHP, DMT, ly-
sergide, LSD, LSD-25, Mescaline, Parahexyl, Psilocine, Psilotsin,
Silocybine, STP, DOM, Tetrahydrocannabinols, and all Isomers. The
items listed in Schedule I are subject to a special provision (article 7)
which prohibits all use except for scientific and very limited medical
purposes. Schedule II - Amphetamine, Desamphetamine, Metham-
phetamine, Methylphenidate, Phencyclidine, Phenmetrazine. Schedule
26 E/Conf. 58/6 19 Feb. 1971; see for its history the records of the Commission which,
at its 23d session, 13 Jan. 1969, adopted a draft protocol thereafter submitted to govern-
ments for comment by June 30, 1969. For text of draft, see U.N. Doc. E/4606/Rev. I,
Annex IV (May 1969), also in 8 Int'l Leg. Materials 769, July 1969.
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III - Amobarbital, Cyclobarbital, Glutethimide, Pentobarbital, Seco-
barbital. Schedule IV - Amfepramone, Barbital, Ethchlorvynol, Ethi-
namate, Meprobamate, Methaqualone, Methylphenobarbital, Methpry-
Ion, Phenobarbital, Pipradrol and SPA.
This convention as its title suggests deals with Psychotropic or
synthetic substances and the term "synthetic" narcotics is generally
applied to a number of dependence-creating substances which came on
the market in 1939, when a German periodical reported the discovery
of a synthetic drug, later called pethidine, with strong analgesic proper-
ties. There is a difference in the basic raw material used in "natural"
and "synthetic" drugs on the basis of the original ingredients used or
what by-products or derivative materials it comes from. This difference
is not always significant since it is possible to manufacture "synthetic"
narcotics from vegetable or animal products, and even poppy straw
might be used as a raw material for production of some chemicals that
could be used in making a synthetic narcotic. That is why the prohibited
substances are specifically listed by schedule in the Convention and are
likely to be changed as discoveries develop.
The new synthetic products raise new control problems resulting
from their growing number, lack of experience with their use and from
the fact that they can be made from materials widely used in industry
and easily accessible even to amateur chemists.
The mushrooming development of various new synthetic drugs
and their appearance on the market, sometimes under false or mislead-
ing claims that they do not produce dependence, have led the Commis-
sion on Narcotic Drugs to issue repeated warnings to governments to
apply measures of control on these substances, pending the definite es-
tablishment of their effects by WHO. The Commission has taken the
view held by scientists and law enforcement agencies that commercial
interests must yield to overriding considerations of public health and be
subjected to greater controls. In this connection, it has also been sug-
gested, without encroaching upon the freedom of the press, that a way
should be sought to prohibit misleading publicity and advertising of
properties of newly developed drugs but this suggestion has yet to be
adopted in most countries. Greater controls over the manufacturing,
labelling, advertising and sale of drugs with stimulant-depressant effects
and with dependence-creating properties should be exercised. In the
United States, the Food and Drug Administration exercises mild super-
vision, while the Federal Trade Commission and Health and Commerce
Commissions exercise at best benign or nominal supervision.
Control mechanisms should be instituted through identification of
1972]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
packages containing such drugs, the use of non-proprietary names, the
control of intermediary products, limitation of the number of narcotics
in circulation and dissemination of information to the medical and
allied professions on matters connected with these drugs, but few if any
of these ideas have been effectively put in force.
Scientific data is also lacking as to the effects of these drugs even
though since 1953 a research program has been undertaken by WHO
on certain basic problems arising from the development of synthetic
narcotics. Results of this study have appeared in a series of reports en-
titled Synthetic Substances with Morphine-like Effects, but the WHO
lacks the resources to pursue its work effectively. Furthermore, few
nations allocate much resources to such research and even when scien-
tific data is compiled, its international dissemination is limited and
seldom, if ever, is it presented to the public in an informational or edu-
cational manner.
Among the many problems to be resolved is that of the make-shift
laboratory which is perfectly capable of producing most of these sub-
stances. One solution to most of the problems is to treat dependence
and thus curb the demand as well as attempt to control the supply.
These considerations were most prevalent in the mind of the draft-
ers of this Convention, but as in all previous treaties, the divergent
interests of government, private industry and other interested groups
were not likely to permit a more effective treaty to be drafted, let alone
to be signed and ratified. Thus, once more a treaty is borne out of a
spirit of pragmatism wherein the desire to have at least some control
system prevailed over those who advocated none or an unattainable
system in the present context of Realpolitik.
a. Analysis of the Provisions of the Convention and a Brief Com-
parison with the 1961 Single Convention
The Convention relies on the same scheme contemplated by the
1961 Single Convention and in fact its provisions are almost alike. It
relies on the element of notice by a party that a substance previously
uncontrolled should be subject to:
(i) require licenses for manufacture, trade and distribution
as provided in article 8 for substances in Schedule I;
(ii) require medical prescriptions for supply or dispensing
as provided in article 9 for substances in Schedule II;
(iii) comply with the obligations relating to export and import
provided in article 12, except in respect to another Party
having given such notice for substance in question; (art.
7(a)).
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It makes, however, more use of the expertise of WHO particularly
if the World Health Organization finds:
(a) That the substance has the capacity to produce
(i) (1) a state of dependence, and
(2) central nervous system stimulation or depression, re-
sulting in hallucination or disturbance in motor func-
tion or thinking or behaviour or perception or mood,
or
(ii) similar abuse and similar ill effects as a substance in
Schedule I, II, III or IV, and
(b) that there is sufficient evidence that the substance is being or
is likely to be abused so as to constitute a public health and
social problem warranting the placing of the substance under
international control, the World Health Organization shall
communicate to the Commission an assessment of the sub-
stance, including the extent or likelihood of abuse, the degree
of seriousness of the public health and social problem and the
degree of usefulness of the substance in medical therapy; to-
gether with recommendations on control measures, if any, that
would be appropriate in the light of its assessment. (art. 2-4)
Providing for special means of controlling such preparations, the
Convention relies on the same indirect method of the previous narcotics
treaties, but some of the escape clauses are, however, quite noticeable.
One such clause is article 3-2 which exempts countries from certain re-
quirements under articles 8, 11, 13, 15, 16 and 22 whenever the:
preparation containing a psychotropic substance other than a sub-
stance in Schedule I is compounded in such a way that it presents
no, or a negligible, risk of abuse and the substance cannot be re-
covered by readily applicable means in a quantity liable to abuse,
so that the preparation does not give rise to a public health and
social problem....
Such a finding is made unilaterally by a party seeking the exemp-
tion for one or more of the measures of control. Such a party shall notify
the Secretary-General of any such decision, of the name and composition
of the exempt preparation, and of the measures of control from which it
is exempted. The Secretary-General shall transmit the notification to
the other Parties, to the World Health Organization and to the Board,
who may, however, make a different finding and advise the Secretary-
General and the Commission shall decide if the substance should be
controlled.
The method of recordkeeping and control, from manufacture to
consumption, via distribution, warehousing, and shipment is left to each
signatory without international control and is, therefore, likely to prove
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inexistent or at best ineffective. The Commission and the Board under-
take essentially the same functions as they do with respect to the 1961
Single Convention. Secretary of State William Rogers, in his letter of
submission to the President transmitted to the Senate with the request
that the Convention be ratified by the United States, stated:
There are a number of significant differences between the two
Conventions, including the following. The new Convention does
not undertake to control the cultivation of plants from which
psychotropic substances may be derived as in the case of the Single
Convention with respect to narcotic drugs. Provision is made in
the new Convention that assessments by the World Health Organi-
zation are determinative as to medical and scientific matters with
respect to psychotropic substances. Decisions by the United Nations
Commission on Narcotic Drugs to place a new psychotropic sub-
stance under control or to change existing controls over a substance
must be by a two-thirds majority of members. With respect to con-
trols over narcotic drugs under the Single Convention they are bind-
ing immediately upon receipt by the parties of notification thereof.
Corresponding decisions under the new Convention regarding psy-
chotropic substances are not binding until 180 days after their re-
ceipt; a party may take an exception to such a decision and apply
a lower category of controls to the substance. The manufacture,
export, import and use of substances in Schedule I of the new
Convention is more restricted than drugs in the comparable
Schedule of the Single Convention. No annual estimates of quan-
tities of psychotropic substances are necessary under the new Con-
vention as in the case of narcotic drugs under the Single Conven-
tion. Under the Single Convention preparations containing a drug
under control are subject to all the controls to which the drug itself
is subject except where lesser controls may be applied after the
preparation has been included in Schedule III to that Convention,
but under the new controls to a preparation if the party exempts
the preparations, such exemption is subject to replacement by
a decision of the Commission to terminate the exemption of the
preparation from any or all control measures.
The difference between the two Conventions arise basically
from the fact that the world community has had over half a cen-
tury of experience in the application of international controls to
narcotic drugs beginning with The Hague Convention of 1912, and
has had no such experience with respect to the psychotropic sub-
stances; the production of narcotic drugs is of far more economic
and social significance to countries that cultivate the opium poppy
and the coca bush than the manufacture of the psychotropic sub-
stances is to the manufacturing countries; there are a great many
more kinds of psychotropic substances than there are of narcotic
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drugs, and the quantities of psychotropics manufactured are much
greater than the quantities of narcotics manufactured.2 7
The distinctions between the two Conventions are not limited to
those cited in Secretary Rogers' letter. The Psychotropic Convention
permits international travelers to carry small amounts of substances for
personal use provided such substances were lawfully obtained. The
Single Convention makes no such allowance. All manufacturing, trade
and distribution of psychotropic drugs must be licensed under the new
Convention unless a Party applies for an exemption because of ex-
ceptional circumstances. The Single Convention requires no form of
licensing for the manufacture, trade or distribution of narcotic drugs if
said activities are conducted by government enterprise. The new con-
vention requires the Parties to set up a system of inspection regarding
the manufacture, trade, distribution or medical or scientific use of any
psychotropic substance. No such requirement is imposed by the Single
Convention. The provisions with respect to actions to be taken against
illicit traffic are identical except for the additional requirement in the
1971 Convention that any Party discovering an instance of illicit traf-
ficking shall immediately report such incident to any other Party di-
rectly concerned. The 1971 Convention contains no explicit provision
allowing for the seizure and confiscation of illicit drugs as does the 1961
Single Convention.
b. The Penal Provisions and Sanctions Approach in the Conven-
tion on Psychotropic Substances and the Single Convention
The territorial principle of jurisdiction is invoked in both Con-
ventions as it is throughout all of the narcotics treaties, but concur-
rently, signatories are urged to prosecute or alternatively extradite
individual violators on the additional theory of "universality" because
violation of the narcotics treaties constitute an "international crime."
Article 22 of the Convention on Psychotropic Substances and article 36
of the Single Convention relate to the penal provisions of their respec-
tive Convention. Both articles are identical and state:
Subject to the constitutional limitations of a Party's legal system
and domestic law:
(a) (i) if a series of related actions constituting offences under
paragraph 1 has been committed in different countries,
each of them shall be treated as a distinct offence;
27 Message from the President of the United States transmitting copy of the Conven-
tion on Psychotropic Substances, signed at Vienna 21 Feb. 1971, to the Senate, 92d Cong.
1st Sess., June 29, 1971 G.P.O. 65/118, Vol VII.
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(ii) intentional participation in, conspiracy to commit and at-
tempts to commit, any of such offences, and preparatory
acts and financial operations in connection with the of-
fences referred to in this article, shall be punishable of-
fences as provided in paragraph 1;
(iii) foreign convictions for such offences shall be taken into
account for the purpose of establishing recidivism; and
(iv) serious offences heretofore referred to committed either by
nationals or by foreigners shall be prosecuted by the Party
in whose territory the offences were committed, or by the
Party in whose territory the offender is found if extradi-
tion is not acceptable in conformity with the law of the
Party to which application is made, and if such offender
has not already been prosecuted and judgment given.
(b) It is desirable that the offences referred to in paragraph 1 and
paragraph 2 (a) (ii) be included as extradition crimes in any
extradition treaty which has been or may hereafter be con-
cluded between any of the Parties, and, as between any of the
Parties which do not make extradition conditional on the exis-
tence of a treaty or on reciprocity, be recognized as extradition
crimes; provided that extradition shall be granted in conform-
ity with the law of the Party to which application is made, and
that the Party shall have the right to refuse to effect the arrest
or grant the extradition in cases where the competent authori-
ties consider that the offence is not sufficiently serious.
The two provisions are identical even in their paragraph and sub-
paragraph numbering. They impose a duty upon the signatory state to
punish violations of this Convention by making such violations a crime
under municipal law, but do not disallow multiple prosecutions and
repeated punishment in every territory or state in violation of the prin-
ciple of double jeopardy (NE BIS IN IDEM).2s Significantly, they make
conspiracy a crime even though that type of offense is peculiar only to
the Anglo-American legal system and those countries which have been
inspired by the common law. The penal provisions further provide for
a partial recognition of foreign judgments with respect to recidivists
without regard for the rights of the offender in such cases and fail to
set forth the basis for such cooperation between states with respect to
the recognition and consequences of foreign penal convictions. The
most astonishing observation is that these penal provisions do not re-
quire states to include the offense of illicit narcotic traffic (cultivation,
manufacturing, sale, transportation and their derivative operations) in
their extradition treaties or reciprocal practices. Even when a state
agrees to extradite such offenders, the provisions have an astounding
28 See however Art. 36, § 2a, iv; see also BAssroum, supra note 17, at 127-37.
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escape clause which is that if in the opinion of the state of refuge the
offense is "not sufficiently serious," it does not have to extradite the
accused offender. Recognizing the principle "universality" by allowing
any state wherein the offender may be found to prosecute for the offense
as an alternative to extradition, it nonetheless only suggests the "de-
sirability" to make it an extraditable offense. No wonder so few treaties
contain such violations in their list of extraditable offenses.29 This
defect was cured in the 1972 Amending Protocol discussed below.
A particularly laudable feature which appears in the Psychotropic
Convention is its concern with treatment of drug-dependent persons,
even though the premise is likely to remain hollow and its implementa-
tion very doubtful in the case of many signatories.
Article 22-1
(b) Notwithstanding the preceding sub-paragraph when abus-
ers of psychotropic substances have committed such offences, the
Parties may provide, either as an alternative to conviction or
punishment or in addition to punishment, that such abusers
undergo measures of treatment, education, after-care, rehabilitation
and social reintegration in conformity with paragraph 1 of article
20.
Article 20 deals with measures against the abuse of psychotropic
substances and requires that:
1. The Parties shall take all praticable measures for the prevention
of abuse of psychotropic substances and for the early identifica-
tion, treatment, education, after-care, rehabilitation and social
reintegration of the persons involved and shall co-ordinate their
efforts to these ends;
2. The Parties shall as far as possible promote the training of per-
sonnel in the treatment, after-care, rehabilitation and social
reintegration of abusers of psychotropic substances;
3. The Parties shall assist persons whose work so requires to gain
an understanding of the problems of abuse of psychotropic sub-
stances and of its prevention, and shall also promote such under-
standing among the general public if there is a risk that abuse
of such substances will become widespread.
Such humane understanding has not been prevalent in other
treaties, but suggests that over-emphasis on punitive and retributive
conceptions of narcotics control are giving way to a more scientific and
humanitarian approach. This is a major difference in the sanctions
orientation of both treaties since the provision dealing with treatment
of drug-dependent persons in the single convention states, article 38:
20 For a list of US. Treaties see Bassiouni, supra note 4, at 3.
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1. The Party shall give special attention to the provision of facili-
ties for the medical treatment, care and rehabilitation of drug
addicts.
2. If a Party has a serious problem of drug addiction and its eco-
nomic resources permit, it is desirable that it establish adequate
facilities for the effective treatment of drug addicts.
The approach is recommendatory as in the advisability clause on
extradition mentioned above and not mandatory. In a decade there has
been no change in the language of the penal provisions and its extradi-
tion clause, but the concern over drug dependence took a more positive
tone.
It should be noted that WHO has suggested since the fifties that the
term "addiction" and "habituation" be replaced by that of "depen-
dence" and has since sponsored many studies on this subject. It has also
initiated the use of the term "abuser" instead of "addict." This new
terminology was not used in the 1961 Single Convention, but appears
in the Convention on Psychotropic Substances and it is not clear if the
reason for it was dictated by the differences between the types of drugs
covered in the 1961 Single Convention as distinguished from Psycho-
tropic Substances or because of popular acceptance of the conceptual
significance of both terms.
The results of scientific tests and pharmacological distinctions be-
tween cannabis sativa drugs, opium-morphine and cocaine are not re-
flected in either of these Conventions (other than in the schedules)
which are primarily penal sanctions oriented and only secondarily treat-
ment-rehabilitation conscious. In this respect the Psychotropic Con-
vention is more attuned to contemporary scientific research findings
than its 1961 predecessor. One reason may well be the decade of scien-
tific research that separates both of these conventions.
c. The 1972 Geneva Protocol Amending the 1961 Single Con-
vention on Narcotic Drugs30
On May 20, 1971, ECOSOC called a plenipotentiary conference to
consider proposed amendments to the 1961 Single Convention. All
signatories were eligible to participate, as well as all members of the
United Nations and its specialized agencies. The conference was con-
vened at Geneva and 97 participants were registered, of which 3 were
observers.
The amendment process had been initiated by the United States in
March, 1971 (as discussed earlier in the text), and in October, 1971,
30 U.N. Doc. E/Conf 63/8 (1972).
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France, Peru and Sweden proposed additional amendments. The
amendments proposed were revised and sponsored by 19 nations3' but
shortly before the conference convened, an additional 11 nations
32
became sponsors.
The conference adopted the Amending Protocol by a vote of 71
in favor, none against and 12 abstentions and is now open for signatures
to all parties to the Single Convention (or parties adhering thereto) and
will enter into force upon adhesions by 40 nations. To date 36 have
adhered.33
The Amending Protocol continues to rely on the indirect scheme of
control depending too significantly on governmental cooperation with-
out direct enforcement sanction or even independent fact-finding ma-
chinery. Nonetheless, it did make certain notable improvements in the
present system. They are:
1. Increased competence of the Board: heretofore the Board's
authority extended primarily to licit cultivation, production, manufac-
ture, trade and use of narcotic drugs. The Board is now enlisted in the
efforts to control illicit traffic and, therefore, in being so charged, is
given increased competence and broader responsibilities.
2. Reorganization of the Board: The Board is to be enlarged,
made more representative, insured of continuity by staggering the
terms of its members, strengthened by the appointment of its secretary
by the Secretary-General and made more independent through the
choice of its administrative personnel to be supplied by the General-
Secretariat.
3. The Estimate System: is to be tightened by requiring more and
new information on forms provided by the Board who will devise a
31 Argentina, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Denmark, Federal Republic of Germany, Finland,
France, Ghana, Greece, Haiti, Iran, Italy, Laos, Norway, Panama, Sweden, the United
Kingdom, the United States and Uruguay.
32 Brazil, Cambodia, Colombia, El Salvador, Guatamala, Indonesia, Ireland, Nicaragua,
Pakistan, Thailand, and Venezuela.
.33 Amending Protocol of Geneva Has Been Signed Subject to Ratification by Following
Countries, as of March 27, 1972:
Argentina Guatemala Monaco
Belgium Haiti Nicaragua
Brazil Holy See Norway
Chile Indonesia Philippines
Costa Rica Iran South Africa
Cyprus Israel Spain
Denmark Italy Sweden
Ecuador Ivory Coast Togo
Egypt Jordan Turkey
Federal Republic of Cambodia United Kingdom
Germany Liberia United States
France Liechtenstein Venezuela
Ghana Luxembourg Viet-Nam
Greece Madagascar Yugoslavia
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method of checks to insure compliance and determine with greater
accuracy ascertainable areas of cultivation.
4. Informational Input: It will receive information from a wider
range of sources, including the United Nations and its Specialized
Agencies and certain inter-governmental and accredited non-govern-
mental organizations with competence in drug matters. Signatories
must also, in addition to the new estimate procedure, furnish informa-
tion on all forms of illicit drug activity from cultivation to usage.
5. Informational Output: The Board has the right to establish,
communicate and publish its own estimates, even if governments dis-
agree. It can also make studies and reports, propose remedial action to
governments and use the vehicle of referring matters to the Commission
on Narcotic Drugs, ECOSOC and the General Assembly as a device to
insure compliance with the terms of the Convention. (This is probably
the closest form to a direct enforcement scheme that international co-
operation has ever achieved so far).
6. Control and Sanctions: The estimate system and all informa-
tional measures are designed to accomplish the objective of control and
indirect sanction. In addition the Amending Protocol established other
devices:
(A) If the Board has reason to believe that the aims of the Single
Convention are seriously endangered by the failure of a country to
carry out its obligations or if there is evidence that a country has
become or is in danger of becoming an important center of illicit
cultivation, production, manufacture or consumption of narcotics,
the Board will be able to ask the government in question for ex-
planations, or consultations, or take the initiative in proposing an
on-the-spot study of the situation designed to develop remedial
measures where those appear necessary; (non-governmental infor-
mational input described in #3 above will be significant in setting
this device in motion).
(B) If a country fails to provide satisfactory explanations or to
adopt remedial measures when requested to do so, or if the Board
believes a serious situation exists which requires cooperative reme-
dial action, it may call this to the attention of all other parties,
ECOSOC and the United Nations Commission on Narcotic Drugs,
with appropriate recommendations and with potential submission
of the matter to the General Assembly. It is significant that for
the first time in history parties to an international narcotics treaty
consider the drug situation to be so serious and so universal that it
may merit the attention of the most representative United Nations'
political organ.
(C) The Board is furthermore required to refer to ECOSOC if the
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aims of the convention are endangered and the matter has not been
satisfactorily resolved.
(D) If in any country producing licit opium there is evidence of
diversion into illicit traffic, the Board may, 90 days after notifying
the government concerned, require that country to reduce its pro-
duction in the following year.
7. Extradition: Although a control device, extradition in this case
is used indirectly as such. The Amending Protocol fills a notorious gap
in this area. Extradition of violators of the 1961 Single Convention as
amended by this protocol is mandatory. These offenses must be in-
cluded in treaties and extradition must be granted in the absence of a
treaty. It still requires another positive step on the part of signatories
which is to amend their extradition treaties in accordance with this
new provision. This provision was patterned along the 1970 Hague
Convention amending the 1963 Tokyo Convention on Aircraft Hijack-
ing. The Amending Protocol, however, has an exception in cases where
the narcotics offense is not deemed sufficiently serious in which case
extradition is no longer mandatory. The caveat that states can make
reservation on this clause weakens it.
8. Technical Assistance: The Board will be authorized to recom-
mend to competent United Nations organs and Specialized Agencies
that technical and financial assistance be provided to governments in
support of their efforts to carry out their obligations under the Single
Convention as amended.
9. Treatment and Rehabilitation: All parties to the Single Con-
vention as amended will be committed to give special attention to the
prevention of drug abuse, to the treatment, education, rehabilitation
and social reintegration of persons affected by drugs. Consistent with
this is the provision for making available to abusers of narcotic drugs,
either as an alternative to conviction or punishment or in addition to
punishment, measures of treatment, education, after-care, rehabilita-
tion and social reintegration.
10. Preventive Measures: Realizing the importance of curbing
user-demand, the Amending Protocol relied on the rehabilitative ap-
proach mentioned in 4#9 and also proposed that governments undertake
such programs as drug education and other measures to prevent drug
abuse.
The accomplishments of the Geneva Conference were noteworthy
even if many provisions of the Amending Protocol are couched in terms
of a "best efforts" clause. The indirect scheme has progressed in the
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direction of a more effective international control scheme, particularly
in view of the prevailing difficulties to achieve harmonious cooperative
undertakings at the international level.
III
THE SUPPRESSION OF ILLICIT TRAFFIC IN DANGEROUS DRUGS
AND NARCOTICS UNDER THE PRESENT SCHEME
OF INTERNATIONAL CONTROL
The illicit traffic in drugs and the criminal activities of smugglers
are of concern to the world community without distinction. The top
organizers of the international illicit traffic do not in most cases physi-
cally handle any drugs themselves, but instigate, finance and direct
these operations which are carried out by underlings and then diffused
to the users by pushers who perpetuate and disseminate these drugs as
part of an organized snowballing system.
The international nature of the offense ideally requires the appli-
cation of the principle of universality of jurisdiction in national crime
legislation and calls for punishment of violators irrespective of their
nationality or the place of their crime. Thus, where international traf-
fickers cannot be prosecuted in the country in which they are found,
they should be extradited to a country which is willing to try them, but
this is not accomplished by a "desirability" clause in narcotics treaties,
but by a mandatory clause coupled with a multilateral extradition treaty
as part of the international control system.
The 1936 Convention for the Suppression of the Illicit Traffic in
Dangerous Drugs introduced the optional principle of universality for
adoption by municipal penal legislation to ensure that illicit traffickers
would not escape prosecution because of lack of criminal jurisdiction.
The adoption of municipal uniform penal sanctions, however, is a very
difficult task because of ideological and political divergences and dif-
ferent cultural traditions on which this type of legal control ultimately
depends. The 1936 Convention limited itself to the formulation of
rather vague provisions accompanied by escape clauses, in order to
secure adherence by countries which would otherwise never accept stip-
ulations basically different from their national standards. The 1961
Single Convention expresses only the desirability of making narcotic
crimes subject to extradition (a provision it takes over from the 1936
treaty), but if the Amending Protocol enters into force it would be
mandatory. The Parties to it are to take action against the illicit traffic
and to provide for the punishment of narcotic offences but it does not
distinguish between international traffickers, local pushers, dealers,
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users and addicts. It requires that parties should make arrangements at
the national level for co-ordinating preventive and repressive action
against illicit traffic by setting up special agencies for such co-ordination
and for assisting each other in fighting the illicit traffic by exchanging
information and legal papers for the purpose of prosecuting offenders.
The way these obligations are worded they are no more than a "best
efforts" clause. Governments are required to furnish the Secretary-Gen-
eral particulars of each important case of illicit traffic, the source from
which drugs are obtained for such illicit traffic and the methods em-
ployed by illicit traffickers. This type of data report is wholly ineffective
in practice even though in theory perfectly laudable. The 1972 pro-
posed amendments are intended to remedy this shortcoming, but it is
doubtful that they will do more than improve the dissemination of
information.
Governments have recognized after decades of narcotics treaties
that, in order to be effective, penalties imposed on traffickers must have
a deterring effect in which the penalty overweighs, in the eyes of the,
potential offender, the benefits of the prohibited activity. Only recently,
however, have all countries enacted prison terms rather than fines for
such violations. Some countries have even introduced capital punish-
ment for certain crimes in the illicit traffic of narcotic drugs, especially
when minors are exploited or led into addiction. But these measures
have largely proven to be ineffective as the number of narcotics users
and abusers is on the increase throughout the world.
Prevention and enforcement of narcotics violations is still the most
cloak-and-dagger undercover activity in existence. It is often the result
of years of work involving many persons, some of whom need to main-
tain their secret identity. Such an activity is, therefore, not likely to be
printed in the United Nations Secretary-General Report on "the last
catch," and invaluable cooperation which should be institutionalized
is relegated to personal exchanges of confidences between agents or
agencies who have developed some form of working relationship.
The Commission on Narcotic Drugs reviews annually the general
problem of illicit trade in individual drugs as well as the situation of
the international traffic on a country-by-country basis. This review is
based on information supplied by governments and such other sources
as INTERPOL. Although the seizure reports furnished by governments
may show here and there a decrease in the quantity of drugs seized in
illicit trade as indicating effective control, the recent surveys of the
Commission indicate that, on the whole, the illicit traffic remains at a
high level and remains well organized.
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The most important drugs in the illicit traffic (both international
and local) are still opium and the opiates (principally morphine and
heroin) which continue to present the greatest problem to national and
international authorities. Opium originates mainly in the Middle East,
in a well-defined triangular area in South East Asia along the borders of
Burma, Thailand, and Laos and in the Peoples' Democratic Republic of
China which is producing and exporting an unknown quantity of drugs,
since it is outside the international control scheme. In the Middle East,
some opium seems to escape local control where it is licitly cultivated,
but most of it comes from illicit cultivation. The 1970 report of the
International Narcotics Control Board stated the problem, ". .. even
if leakage from licit production could be virtually extinguished smug-
glers would still be able to have recourse to opium which is produced
illegally or beyond government control. There are now extensive areas
of such production and it is essential that, side by side with reinforcing
monopoly controls over licit production, major efforts should be made
to eliminate poppy cultivation in these areas .... The regions chiefly
involved are situated in Afghanistan, Burma, Laos and Thailand; and
there is also some production in parts of Latin America."8 4 The profit
is so great in the area of illicit production that it will be impossible for
these countries to be wholly successful in containing such activity. Add-
ing to it the volume of individual travelers makes attempts at control
at best haphazard. There is no system of international customs coopera-
tion or data bank for international exchange of information. INTER-
POL, however, maintains a reference operation and signals individuals
to customs or police officials, but their activity is naturally limited.
Opium, as is well known, is used in clandestine factories for the
manufacture of morphine, which is then converted into heroin. Mor-
phine and particularly heroin are much more potent than opium and
much less bulky, thus much easier to smuggle to countries such as the
United States, Canada, Thailand, and Vietnam, where drug depen-
dence especially to heroin has become a serious problem as it has also in
other countries such as in Iran and Hong Kong. The United States, for
example, has an estimated addiction population of half a million drug-
dependent persons, but its breakdown as to typology of drug users is
very uncertain. An estimated 3.5 billion dollars is spent on illicit drugs
in the United States annually. Smuggling heroin is very profitable and
not easily detectable. At a time when world trade expansion requires the
reduction of administrative and customs controls and the volume of
34 U.N. Doc. E/1NCB/9 (1970).
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international trade is so great, the task of customs detection is extraor-
dinary. On June 30, 1971, Prime Minister Erim of Turkey declared:
We cannot allow Turkey's supreme interests and the prestige
of our nation to be further shaken. Our government has decided to
apply a dear and firm solution. It forbids completely the planting
of poppies ....
Poppies will not be planted in Turkey beginning next year....
This laudable step is not likely to completely prevent illicit pro-
duction since wherever cultivation was permitted it had always been
government controlled. Some illicit cultivation is still expected to take
place until modern techniques such as aerial and ground inspection can
be used as well as the maintenance of a permanent governmental
control structure. Hopefully, Turkey will continue to be vigilant even
if the decree abolishing any licit cultivation is likely to take the heat off
its public agencies. It is also noteworthy that Thailand started a pilot
program of crop substitution to curtail the extent of traditionally legal
opium growing. Unfortunately, Iran decided in 1969 to resume poppy
cultivation to the extent necessary to satisfy its own internal demand.
The INCB has expressed grave concern over reports that poppy culti-
vation in Iran is to be markedly increased in the near future.
Cannabis sativa in its various forms, such as marijuana and hashish,
continues to be in quantitative terms the biggest narcotic substance in
the international illicit traffic; financially heroin is still the largest
money producer. Cannabis-type plants grow in many parts of the world
with great ease and represent, therefore, a particularly difficult problem
to enforcement agencies. In the Middle East, Asia, Africa and Latin
America this drug crosses frontiers in bulk, although in some countries
it is mainly a domestic problem. Cocaine from coca leaves grown mainly
in Latin America appears in the international traffic on a smaller scale
than opium and heroin, but the traffic in this drug seems to be spreading
through Latin America and to other parts of the world. The reason is
that it is in much less demand which confirms the idea that priority
should be given to curtailing demand and curbing the profit motive.
Analysts of these problems tend to look at them more in terms of law
enforcement than of user-demand. This is why the international con-
cern as well as that of most states is with repressive penal sanctions
rather than curtailing user-demand by scientific means and developing
a method of direct control over production and manufacturing of all
such drugs and curbing the profit incentive of those engaged in this
type of illicit activity.
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It is true by and large that the illicit traffic is unable to obtain any
significant supplies of drugs from legally-manufactured channels except
for synthetic drugs wherein seizures have been seriously increasing in
recent years and are often retraceable to licit channels of manufacturing,
particularly amphetamines and other stimulants and depressants stolen
in the course of trade.
The recent increase in illicit narcotics traffic has been attributed
to four factors: more raw narcotic materials are being processed closer
to the place of cultivation; the tremendous increase in non-syndicate
drug traffickers; the new interest of the youth of the Western countries
in the cultures of the Eastern part of the world; and the greater speed
and facility of transport available to drug traffickers. The means of
transportation in the international illicit traffic are not limited to ships
and their crew members as governments' seizure reports point to a grow-
ing use of commercial and private aircraft by traffickers. In 1952, the
Economic and Social Council recommended that the Secretary-General
compile and bring up to date at regular intervals a list of merchant
seafarers and members of the civil air crews who have been convicted of
narcotic offences on or after January 1, 1953. Such crew members are to
be blacklisted and not employed again onboard ships or aircraft, as the
case may be, but little ever came of that device. Another method of
transportation is the ordinary tourist and the unwary courier. The
extraordinary increase in tourism and business travel makes thorough
individual customs inspection a practical impossibility. Customs
agencies are on the horns of a dilemma: should they ease their inspec-
tions to make the tourist feel welcome or be thorough and catch the
smuggler? Economic realism makes most countries opt for the former
measure. Another channel must not be discounted and that is the
regular shipment of goods in international trade. Most narcotic drugs
are easily concealable and can be shipped with goods and merchandise
without too much fear of discovery in customs. The only reason it is not
used frequently is fear that intermediate handlers of the legitimate mer-
chandise may find it and take it, not fear of customs seizure.
Valuable help in combating illicit traffic and activities of traffickers
is rendered by INTERPOL, which acts as a clearing house for national
law enforcement agencies. The organization, whose headquarters is in
Paris, provides information on illicit traffic to the organs of international
and national narcotics control and usually participates, through an ob-
server, in the Commission's meetings. It organizes conferences and
seminars for national police forces and other services such as customs.
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INTERPOL remains, however, an agency without supranational power
and is not, as the name suggests, a true international police.
The Division of Narcotic Drugs of the United Nations Secretariat
carries out research in its laboratory in Geneva, and national labora-
tories and individual scientists in various parts of the world also partici-
pate in the United Nations program of drug research. The laboratory
helped to co-ordinate opium research that was carried out by scientists
throughout the world and arranged for the distribution of opium sam-
ples for this work. Some of the laboratory research is on the analysis of
government authenticated samples of opium which originated or were
discovered in that country. Several scientific methods have been de-
veloped and after extensive testing are now conclusively applied to
determine the geographical origin of samples of opium seized in illicit
traffic and thus help to pinpoint its illicit origin.
The United Nations, cognizant of the importance of curbing user-
demand for illicit drugs, instituted a program of drug abuse control in
March 1971. In an Aide-Memoire released by the Secretary-General it
was stated:
3. The demand for drugs comes from large numbers of addicts
and habitual abusers in many parts of the world, and it stimulates
both production and the illicit traffic. To diminish demand, addicts
and abusers must be treated and reintegrated as productive mem-
bers of society. This treatment and reintegration cannot follow a
wholly uniform pattern everywhere, but must be based on studies
which take full account of social and economic conditions, cultural
traditions, etc., in each country or region. Moreover, demand must
also be reduced by preventive measures, which include education,
particularly of young people in the dangers of drug-taking and ad-
diction. In developing countries, measures to reduce the demand
require the help of developed countries. If such help is not forth-
coming, there is a serious risk that addiction will spread from new
sources of contagion, and that new centres for the illicit traffic will
come into being.
4. The repression of the illicit traffic requires the strengthen-
ing of enforcement action in many countries of the world. No
country can defend itself against the illicit traffic without the co-
operation of other countries, and common efforts will have to be
undertaken on the international level to deal with this aspect.
5. The purpose of the United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse
Control will be to develop short-term and long-term plans and pro-
grammes along the lines indicated above, and to provide assistance
in the execution of those plans and programmes. During the initial
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stages of the Fund, pending the completion and submission of a pro-
posed long-term policy and plan of action which would deal with
all aspects of the problems related to drug abuse control, the volun-
tary contributions to the Fund will be used for specific projects to
be included in a short-term programme without prejudice to on-
going projects. The short-term programme will consist of projects
to expand the research and information facilities of United Nations
drug-control bodies; to plan and implement programmes of techni-
cal assistance in pilot projects for crop substitution purposes, the
establishment and improvement of national drug-control adminis-
trations and enforcement machinery, the training of personnel, and
in setting up or expanding research and training centres which
could serve national or regional needs; to enlarge the capabilities
and extend the operations of United Nations drug-control bodies
and their secretariats; to promote facilities for the treatment, re-
habilitation and social reintegration of drug addicts; and to de-
velop educational material and programmes suitable for use on
high-risk populations.8 5
The Fund shall be financed through voluntary national contributions
and after one year of interim administration, it will be placed under the
direction of the Division of Narcotic Drugs.
IV.
CONCLUSIONS AND A PROPOSAL OF AN ALTERNATIV PLAN
The indirect method of control bears its endemic weakness in that
its control scheme relies on the willingness and effectiveness of multiple
participants in a process in which not all share the same degree of con-
cern and interest. These weaknesses, discussed throughout this article,
are only some of those which persons concerned with the problem have
identified over the years. The general scheme of the alternative proposed
is as follows:
1. A direct control scheme whereby an international agency would
have in the case of the opiates the monopoly of production, distribution,
warehousing and sale; in the cases of cocaine and cannabis sativa drugs,
the powers of indirect supervision; and in the case of psychotropic sub-
stances, local controls devices; and
2. Minimum standards of treatment of drug-dependent persons
applicable indirectly by each state, but subject to the international
agency's supervision with an international financial subsidy scheme
wherever needed.
The Direct Control Scheme would be administered by an entirely
restructured International Narcotics Control Board, to be known as the
35 U.N. Doc. SG/SM/1442 Sox/NAR/.104 (1971).
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International Narcotics Control Agency, composed of six functional
boards (see organizational chart below). The International Narcotics
Control Agency would consist of twelve members elected for terms of
four years each by the General Assembly of the UN. The Secretary-
General of the UN would appoint a thirteenth member to act as
Chairman of the Agency. Each of the six boards under the Agency would
be chaired by one member of the Agency to be elected by the Agency
for a term of two years.
The Functional Boards
1. The Central Board for the International Regulation of Drug
Traffic.
This body would serve as a forceful regulatory force primarily
established to create and administer an international monopoly for the
growing of opium and the manufacture of morphine. It would select one
or more locations in the world for growing opium and manufacturing
morphine. The Board would subsidize countries presently growing
poppies and supervise the transition to alternative crops to be grown by
individuals who would be economically injured by the scheme. In
countries like Peru, which are presently considering a program of
general agrarian reform, this transitional process could be instituted
quite easily. This body would continue the estimate and import-export
certification systems. Only individuals, governments or organizations
licensed and supervised by this Board would be permitted to engage in
the production, manufacture, trade and/or distribution of opium and its
derivatives. Any drug traffic outside the auspices of this Board would be
illicit and subject to international penal sanctions.
This Board would be divided into regional sub-boards located
throughout the world wherever drug activity is prevalent. The Board
would consist of six members plus the Chairman, each to be appointed
by the International Narcotics Control Agency for a renewable term of
two years each.
2. Central Drug Control Board
This body would constitute the enforcement arm for the direct
control scheme. It would function in three areas. Within a particular
state, the Central Drug Control Board would have the authority to
direct and supervise arrests, seizures and investigations carried out by
local officials. Although this police force would not have the authority
to make arrests itself, it would be present and supervise law enforcement
activities with respect to internal narcotics control in a particular state.
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This force would also have the responsibility of enforcing the
monopoly structure. It would have the right of direct inspection with
respect to facilities operated by the monopoly and the right to impose a
mandatory embargo where a state did not conform to its obligations
under the monopoly.
Third, the force would serve as a central clearinghouse for in-
formation and statistics pertaining to the status of illicit drug trafficking
in the world. It would serve as a central data bank for such information
as the identity of present offenders and the location of suspected illicit
growing of poppies.
Inasmuch as this Board would function in all areas of the world,
regional sub-boards would be established in key geographic locations.
Similarly, the membership on this Board should reflect a true inter-
national representation. Suggested members would include: Secretary-
General of INTERPOL, Chief of the Division of Criminal Affairs of
the Council of Europe, Director of the Bureau of Narcotics Control of
the Arab League, a representative of the Organization of American
States, and a representative of the Asian-Pacific Council. Each of these
regional members would supervise the activities of the regional office
located in his area. The International Narcotics Police would be staffed
by the nationals in the country in which it would function. To insure
close cooperation between the International Drug Control Board and
the local authorities, each country would be required to establish a Bu-
reau of Narcotics Information and Control if it has not done so already
to act as liaison between the international and local authorities.
3. Arbitration Board for the Resolution of Drug-Related Dis-
putes
This body would serve as a convenient and rapid facility for the
resolution of disputes involving drug activity. Along with the Chairman,
the members of this Board would include the Chief Justice of I.C.J.,
Deputy Secretary-General for Legal Affairs in the UN and the Chair-
man of the International Law Commission. These individuals would be
instrumental in setting up regional forums for arbitration when a dis-
pute arises. The parties would choose one member of the Board to act
as umpire and each party would choose an arbitrator to form a tribunal.
Decisions of the tribunal would be binding upon the parties but review-
able by the International Court of Justice. Significantly, individuals and
organizations of any sort would have standing before any tribunal set up
by this Board.
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4. Clearing House Commission
This body would act as an open market for the purchase and sale of
drug substances. It would be available to individuals and organizations
as well as states. Hopefully, this body would serve as a means to funnel-
off drugs from the channels of illicit drug traffic. Upon receipt of a
quantity of drugs the Commission could then resell them for medical or
scientific purposes through the structure of the monopoly.
In addition to the Chairman, two members would be appointed to
the Commission and would be authorized to set price levels and establish
regional offices in strategic locations throughout the world.
5. Central Board for the Treatment and Study of Drug-Depen-
dence
This Board would assume the responsibility of establishing Mini-
mum Standards of Treatment of Drug-Dependent Persons. Its activities
would attempt to locate treatment centers throughout the world
through direct activities where a country is unable to establish its own
treatment centers. The Board would operate a central facility devoted to
the study and research of the aspect of drug dependence. This central
facility would freely supply information regarding drug dependence to
interested parties. The expertise of WHO and FAO would be utilized
in the administration of these programs.
Some of the minimal standards of treatment of drug-dependent
persons would include:
(a) Recognition that drug dependence is a disease and that as such
is better controlled by treatment than by imprisonment.
(b) Recognition of a distinction between the dependence-creating
properties of the three main categories of drugs, i.e., opium
and its derivatives and cocaine, psychotropic substances and
cannabis sativa and its derivatives.
The Board would seek to establish standards for:
(a) what constitutes dependence.
(b) how should treatment be given for each type of drug depen-
dence.
(c) what are the harmful physiological and/or psychological effects
resulting from the use of specific drug substances.
The Board would consist of five members besides the Chairman
and each would be appointed by the Chairman, perhaps from the per-
sonnel in the WHO or the FAO, for terms of two years each.
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6. Central Legislative Board
This body consisting of seven members appointed by the Chairman,
would assume the responsibility of establishing a proposed model statute
concerning the prevention of drug-related offenses and the enforcement
of such legislation. Such legislation should be based on clearly drawn
distinctions among the three categories of drugs listed above, and should
recognize the relationship between the social harm of the offense and
the penalty imposed. Distinctions should also be made between: (a) in-
ternational traffickers, (b) local pushers and dealers, (c) casual users,
and (d) drug-dependent persons. Each category should be treated dif-
ferently for purposes of prevention, enforcement, repression and
treatment-rehabilitation legislation. Legislation should give the WHO
the authority to add or remove any drug or substance from international
control. Any model treaty-statute should include the following:
(a) The classification of the crime of international drug traffic-
king as an "international crime" with offenders subject to uni-
versal jurisdiction.
(b) Provisions for mandatory extradition with the right of review
before the International Court of Justice with equal standing
for individual recourses as well as states and International Nar-
cotics Control Agency.86
(c) A clear prohibition on the production of opium upon countries
not authorized to grow under the monopoly.
(d) Provisions allowing direct inspection in producing countries
to insure that all drugs remain in licit channels.
(e) Provision that all substances containing drugs shall carry an
international designation of such, not just the proprietary
name.
(f) Provisions allowing for the complete restructuring of the inter-
national control scheme as outlined above with the emphasis
upon direct controls and the establishment of minimal stan-
dards of treatment of drug-dependent persons.
(g) Provisions allowing for the "decriminalization" of the use of
cannabis sativa products. Penalties for possession would be
abolished. Selected manufacturers would be selected and li-
censed to produce and distribute limited quantities of mari-
juana products. This proposal would be based on several
assumptions:
1. that the health hazards in a purified, limited and carefully
processed dosage of cannabis sativa will be reduced to the
level of tobacco cigarettes.
36 This proposal was made by the author to the Xth International Law Congress of
Rome in 1969 in the American National Report; Bassiouni, International Extradition: A
Summary of the Contemporary American Practice and a Proposed Formula, 39 Rlvun
INTERNATIONALE DE DROrr PENAL 494 (1968), reprinted in 15 WAYNE L. Rxv. 733 (1969).
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2. that the use of cannabis sativa does not create a physiologi-
cal dependence and that the degree of psychological depen-
dence which it purportedly creates is doubtful.
3. that the systems of criminal justice in the world will be
freed from the heavy burden of enforcing the restrictions
against petty cannabis sativa.
4. that the sale of cannabis sativa could be regulated by loca-
tion and age of user.
5. that such a program would give a flexibility in which more
serious penal sanctions could be imposed if science proves
the use of cannabis sativa to be more harmful than at pres-
ent and similarly that controls could be liberalized if the
opposite proves to be true.
6. that each country could capably control the licensing proce-
dures, with standards for such licensing set by an interna-
tional agency.
By necessity, such a treaty-statute could only become obligatory
upon the countries of the world by their voluntary acceptance of such.
It is the opinion of this writer that the present international scheme
served its purpose so far but must give way to a direct international con-
trol system; that there is no alternative to a concurrent program of
curtailing user-demand and curbing the profit incentive in illicit traffic
and trade. The President's Commission on Marijuana released some
of its findings which support a form of decriminalization for users. The
proposal outlined above may hopefully trigger an interest in the devel-
opment of an alternative international control scheme to the present
one which proved so ineffective judging by the increased rate of drug
dependence everywhere in the world, even though that system was
achieved arduously and over the span of half a century. It remains
nonetheless, as it always was, one step behind the needs it was to serve.
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